India -US International Relations

India and the U.S. have evolved to share a fairly cooperative relationship, especially in the last one decade. However, this has not always been the case since India gained Independence from the British colonial rule in 1947. With India helming the centre of Non-Alignment Movement with its neutral stance during the Cold War period, the relationship between both the states was constrained and increasingly distrustful with India’s growing closeness with the former USSR (Harshe, 1990).

Historic events such as the 1962 Indo-China war or the Indo-Pak war of 1971 further showcased deteriorating diplomatic ties between both states, with an unsteadiness in support from the U.S., often bordering on hostility and threatening in nature (Council on Foreign Relations, n.d.). The real period of estrangement of ties between both countries occurred when India completed its first nuclear weapon test (Pokhran-I) in 1974 under Indira Gandhi premiership overruling the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1975). This made India the first country besides the five permanent member states of the United Nations to achieve nuclear armament. This was seen as a step towards breaking the hegemony on nuclear power by developed countries, and by the U.S. as a “rude awakening” (Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, n.d.). India’s refusal to accept or abide by the NPT or to allow inspections by International Atomic Energy Agency following its nuclear armament led to the U.S. withdrawing any kind of nuclear assistance to India, including blocking of nuclear fuel shipments.

Only towards the 1990s, Indo-U.S. relations began faring slightly better with India sanctioning many economic reforms overseen by the then Finance Minister Manmohan Singh. This paved the way for better economic ties in terms of international trade and investment, deregulation, initiation of privatisation, tax reforms, and inflation controlling measures with the U.S. (Singh, 1991). However, India announced completion of underground nuclear tests near Pakistan border in 1998 (Pokhran-II), which entirely threw off U.S.-based intelligence agencies and led to the U.S. imposing economic sanctions on India and thus badly damaging the relationship between both countries (Mahapatra, 1998).  Following Bill Clinton’s visit in 2000, which was the first U.S. President’s visit since 1978, the ties between both states began warming up with the U.S. slowly easing first and then lifting off all sanctions that it had placed on India following 1998 nuclear tests (Perlez, 2000). Since 2000s, Indo-U.S. relations have fairly improved under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s tenure, with many deals and ties established in areas such as energy security, defence framework, nuclear cooperation and trade, space cooperation, and economic and trade ties.

Following 2014 elections, there has been a polarising shift in the nature of politics in India itself, largely emerging as a right-wing majority since Narendra Modi had assumed premiership (Sinha, 2014). Cascading effects of this landmark development could be witnessed in the nature of strategic and diplomatic exchanges between India and the U.S. Having once denied visa to Modi (Mulford, 2005) for severe violations of religious freedom for nearly a decade, the White House understood that it could no longer strong-arm India or ignore the formidable figure that the Indian Prime Minister had risen to. This change in attitude may also be attributed to factors such as the critical geopolitical positioning of India as a fast-rising Global South entity, along with the active support and endorsement that Modi enjoys from the diasporic Indian supporters in the U.S., with many having eminent and influential positions in the American society (Shankar, 2019).

An unprecedented increase in the frequency of high-level political visits, dialogues and summits between both states were observed during this period. Significant changes occurred with a proactive Modi vying for a strengthened bilateral strategic partnership and increased economic investments. It was reported that the two sides set a target to increase bilateral trade in goods and services to $500 billion, with Modi and the U.S. President Barrack Obama pledging “to explore new opportunities to break down barriers to the movement of goods and services, and support deeper integration into global supply chains, thereby creating jobs and generating prosperity in both economies”, and the summit’s joint statement calling the India-U.S. relationship an “Enduring Global Partners in the 21^st Century” (Ministry of External Affairs, 2016).

The same year saw the U.S. identifying India as a “Major Defence Partner” (MDP) and renewed 10-year U.S.-India defence framework agreement (Raj, 2016), resulting enhancement in defence trade, joint exercises, personnel exchanges, collaboration and cooperation in maritime security and counter-piracy, and exchanges between each of the three services (Consulate General of India, n.d.; Bureau of Political-Military Affairs., n.d.). Later, India was moved into the Tier-1 of the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Strategic Trade Authorization license exception in 2018 (Ministry of External Affairs, 2018). Some of the important bilateral defence agreements are: Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (2016), Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (2018), Memorandum of Intent for Defense Innovation Cooperation (2018), Industrial Security Agreement (2019), and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (2020).

It is reported that both states have engaged in more than 50 bilateral dialogue mechanisms ever since. The first such dialogue, newly titled ‘Strategic and Commercial Dialogue’ held in 2015 added a commercial element to the traditional Strategic Dialogue model of bilateral relations, now encompassing: Strategic Cooperation; Energy and Climate Change, Education and Development; Economy, Trade and Agriculture; Science and Technology; and Health and Innovation. Further, ministerial-level dialogues involving home (Homeland Security Dialogue), finance (Financial and Economic Partnership), commerce (Trade Policy Forum), HRD (Higher Education Dialogue), Science & Technology (Joint Commission Meeting on S&T), and energy (Energy Dialogue) were also undertaken (Consulate General of India, n.d.).

Starting with Donald Trump’s first administration, a rare brand of camaraderie was observed between both nation heads on a personal front (Press Information Bureau Delhi, 2019), but issues such as racism against immigrants, H-1B visas, trade ties as well as climate change were topics of contention between both parties on international front. While an agreement strengthening military ties with real-time information sharing and exchange of advanced communication technology used in U.S. defence equipment was ensued, this tenure also saw Trump administration ending India’s special trade status, which found India having retaliatory tariffs slapped (BBC, 2019). More defence- and foreign affairs-based agreements were bolstered including the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) in 2020, with the goal of weakening China’s growing power and prominence in the Indo-Pacific region.

This bilateral partnership may be observed as having overtaken what was once an amicable diplomatic partnership between India and Russia during the post-Cold War era through the nineties. With concerns owing to China’s increased economic and military strength, the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) comprising India, the U.S., Japan and Australia had their first in-person leaders’ summit hosted by the Joe Biden administration in 2021 (The White House, 2021; Ministry of External Affairs, 2021). One may assess this as a shift from the usual Global North power dynamics and strategic partnerships. These four states convened a joint military exercise in the midst of increasing regional tensions with China, which again may be viewed as a calculated diplomatic and military move against a common factor of interest.

In 2023, 18^th G-20 Leaders’ Summit was hosted in India with Biden as a major attendee. Both state heads partook in a bilateral meeting and co-hosted a group of G20 leaders, aimed at accelerating investments and development of economic corridors through the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Connectivity Corridor (IMEEC) and the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI) (Ministry of External Affairs, 2024). Further, the same year witnessed the U.S. emerge as the largest trading partner of India with overall bilateral trade in goods and services of $190.1 billion (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019).

Defence cooperation continues to remain an area that both nations are diligently advancing in partnership. The 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue (Ministry of External Affairs, 2024) is co-chaired by the Indian Minister of External Affairs and Minister of Defence, and the U.S. Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, which lays out guidance on bilateral political, military, and strategic issues. The fifth edition took place in New Delhi in 2023, followed by a reciprocal visit to the U.S. by Indian counterparts in 2024, which oversaw a signing of Security of Supply Arrangement (SoSA) and an MoA regarding Assignment of Liaison Officers (LO) in both states. It is reported that India shall accordingly deploy an LO to the U.S. Special Operations Command (U.S. SOCOM) in Tampa, Florida (Press Information Bureau, 2024).

While Russia has remained India’s largest supplier of military equipment even until mid-2023, the U.S. has been pushing for the culmination of this exchange citing how these purchases are funding Russia’s war on Ukraine and by directly engaging India in more strategic trade and critical technologies including provisions like weapons, artificial intelligence, and semiconductors (Sen, 2024).

While such strengthened ties and agreements are in place, there are also areas of contention such as India’s 10-year contract deal with Iran in May 2024 to develop the strategically important Chabahar Port, which led the U.S. to immediately issue warning of potential sanctions for countries considering any form of business deals with Iran (Reuters, 2024) or America’s contentious climate change narratives and the overwhelming Global South burden. Also, with Trump administration coming back in for the second time, areas such as trade wars and anti-immigrant policies are possible points of contention these states may have to deal with in the coming future.

Based on strategic and commercial dialogues, bilateral military agreements (MDP, SoSA, 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue) and joint military partnerships (Quad, BECA), joint economic frameworks (G20 Leaders’ Summit, IMEEC, PGI) along with coordinated foreign policy goals in the last one decade, the India-U.S. relationship could be classified as ‘Cooperative’. 

References

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